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Abstract
We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment
dynamics. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g., an equip-
ment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing but uncertain demand,
and if the supplier has market power, investment occurs too late from an industry standpoint.
The distortion in firm decisions is characterized by a Lerner-type index. Despite the underlying
investment option, greater volatility can result in a lower value for both firms. We examine several
contractual alternatives to induce efficient timing, a novel vertical restraint being for the upstream
to sell a call option on the input. We also extend the model to allow for downstream duopoly.
When downstream firms are engaged in a preemption race, the upstream firm sells the input to
the first investor at a discount such that the race to preempt exactly offsets the vertical distortion,
and this leader invests at the optimal time. These results are illustrated with a case study drawn
from the pharmaceutical industry.
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1 Introduction
In dynamic models of irreversible investment under uncertainty, such as market entry or R&D, the
investment cost (which constitutes the strike price of a so-called investment option) is often tacitly
taken to reflect economic fundamentals closely. This assumption seems reasonable in industries such
as real estate development, or when the investment is performed largely in-house, as may occur with
R&D. However, there are many other cases in which a firm contemplating investment depends on an
outside firm with market power to provide it with a discrete input (e.g., a key equipment) it needs
to start producing and selling. Thus, a local hospital must decide when to buy diagnostic imaging
equipment from an outside firm, an oil company that decides to drill offshore must acquire a platform
from a specialized supplier, or an aeronautics firm will coordinate aircraft development with an engine
manufacturer. In addition, strategic issues can arise if several firms seek to invest in an industry, and
call upon the same supplier. To illustrate, at the end of the paper we outline the case of a market
for a new vaccine, where demand is related to the diffusion of an emerging pathogen, and firms must
invest in a factory constructed to exact specifications before starting operations.
This paper uses advances in irreversible investment and in duopoly investment games to build
a model of vertical relationships in which the cost of a firm’s investment is endogenous. Thus, our
aim is to contribute in a growing research area that straddles industrial organization and corporate
finance. We believe our key originality lies in the integration of two research streams that had seemed
heretofore distinct: modern treatments of irreversible investment choices, as in Dixit and Pindyck [8],
and the classic representation of vertical relationships as described, e.g., by Tirole [28]. Also, we extend
this framework to include similar strategic specifications downstream to those of models by Smit and
Trigeorgis [26], Mason and Weeds [20], and Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [2],1 but with an upstream
equipment supplier that prices with market power. The most closely related work we have identified
is in corporate finance and studies the impact of agency on option exercise, most notably Grenadier
and Wang [12] (corporate governance), and Lambrecht[16], Lambrecht and Myers [17] (takeovers).2
Specifically, we show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships translates directly to
investment timing, with the level of investment trigger replacing price as the decision variable of
1For recent surveys of game theoretic real options models, see Boyer, Gravel, and Lasserre [3], and Huisman, Kort,
Pawlina, and Thijssen [13].
2See also Lambrecht, Pawlina, and Teixeira [18] and Patel and Zavodov [22] for alternative approaches to real options
in vertical structures, and Yoshida [31] for a discussion of the impact of strategic complementarity on investment timing.
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the downstream firm. When an upstream supplier exercises market power, a vertical effect akin to
double marginalization causes the downstream firm to unduly delay its investment relative to the
optimal exercise threshold for the industry. This distortion increases with both market growth and
volatility and decreases with the interest rate. The industry earns lower value under separation than
under integration. In contrast with the standard real option framework, greater volatility decreases
upstream and downstream firm value near the exercise threshold, because of the simultaneous presence
of two effects: the option value of delay is balanced by a greater mark-up choice by the upstream firm.
The study of vertical relationships typically examines contractual restraints, by which an upstream
firm can improve on a fixed input price. We verify that an upstream firm that can contract on
the state of final demand achieves the integrated outcome, but also find that, provided demand
volatility is low, a simple time-dependent pricing rule suffices to approximate the industry optimum.
Alternatively, if spacing out payments is feasible, an option or downpayment restores efficiency. This
latter explanation of use of restraints appears to rationalize existing practices in some industries,
notably Airbus’ approach to marketing aircraft.
Without such contractual alternatives, the upstream firm benefits from the presence of a second
downstream firm, although this possibly occurs at the expense of aggregate industry value. We find
that the race between downstream firms to preempt one another exactly balances the incentive to delay
caused by the upstream firm’s mark-up, so the leader invests at the optimal integrated threshold (as
in the reference case with a single integrated firm), whereas the follower invests at the separation
threshold (for duopoly profits), a type of “no distortion at the top” result. The leader receives a
discounted price, and this discount increases with volatility and decreases with competition in the
downstream product market. The comparison of industry value under different structures reveals that
the three-firm industry structure may be more desirable than both bilateral monopoly (even if adding
a second downstream firm decreases downstream industry profits) and preemption between vertically
integrated firms (even if double marginalization induces firms to delay entry).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model, with
one upstream supplier and one downstream firm, and investigate the basic vertical distortion. This is
done by comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the integrated case, which we use as a benchmark,
with the outcomes of the separated case. In Section 3, we discuss contractual alternatives that aim
to restore the industry optimum and relate them to an industry case. In Section 4, we introduce
a second downstream firm and study equilibrium pricing and investment decisions, then compare
with the outcomes under alternative industry structures. In Section 5, we illustrate the analysis by
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examining the case of an emerging market for a new vaccine. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs and
derivations are in the appendix.
2 The Basic Vertical Distortion
Investment in a discrete input is necessary to operate on a final market. It can be produced and used
by the same firm (integration), or produced by an upstream supplier and used by a downstream firm
(separation). The cost of producing the input is positive and denoted by I. The flow profit resulting
from investment is YtpiM where piM is the instantaneous monopoly profit per unit of Yt, and Yt > 0 is
a scale parameter assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion with drift, dYt = αYtdt+ σYtdZt.
The non-negative parameters α and σ represent the market’s expected growth rate (or “drift”) and
volatility, respectively, and Zt is a standard Wiener process.
3 A lowercase y = Yt is used to denote
the current level of the state variable, and it is assumed throughout the paper that the initial market
size is positive and sufficiently small so firms prefer to delay rather than to invest immediately.4 We
let yi denote a decision variable which is a threshold that, when attained by Yt for the first time and
from below at a stochastic future date, triggers the investment in the discrete input. The discount
rate r > α is common to all firms.5
2.1 Integrated case
Suppose that a single firm produces the discrete input, is able to observe the current market size, and
thus may decide at which future threshold to invest so as to earn the subsequent flow profit. Given
the investment cost I and the current market size y, the value of a firm that decides to invest when
the market reaches size yi ≥ y is:
V (y, yi, I) =
(
piM
r − αyi − I
)(
y
yi
)β
, (1)
where β (α, σ, r) ≡ 12 − ασ2 +
√(
α
σ2
− 12
)2
+ 2r
σ2
is a function of parameters, referred to as β for concise-
ness, that occurs throughout the paper. The expressions of V (y, yi, I) in (1), and of β, are standard
3The geometric Brownian motion is derived from Yt = Y0 exp
[(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
t+ σZt
]
by using Itoˆ’s lemma.
4Specifically, we suppose that Y0 <
β
β−1
r−α
piM
I, where β is a function of parameters defined in Section 2.1.
5A firm may delay investment indefinitely if r ≤ α.
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in real option models (see Dixit and Pindyck [8], Chapter 5, or Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis,
Chapters 11-12).6 We will use the property that β is decreasing in α and in σ, and increasing in r,
throughout the paper.
The integrated firm’s decision problem is maxyi≥y V (y, yi, I). Since the objective is quasiconcave,
differentiating (1) gives the value-maximizing investment trigger, y∗ = ββ−1
r−α
piM
I, which serves as a
benchmark throughout the analysis. The current value of the firm that invests at the optimal threshold
y∗ is:
V (y, y∗, I) =
I
β − 1
(
y
y∗
)β
. (2)
2.2 Separated case
Suppose that the input production and investment decisions are made by distinct firms. In this case
a vertical externality arises. The following assumptions are made in order to describe this externality
simply and distinctly. First, the upstream firm, as an input producer on the intermediate market,
does not observe the state of the system (the downstream market size y) at any date, including t = 0.
However it knows the structural parameters of the demand process. Its only choice consists of the input
price pS ≥ I (thereby determining the terms of the downstream firm’s investment option). The input
price is taken to be constant, although the upstream may generally prefer to have its price increase
over time in order to hasten downstream investment (see Section 3.2). Second, the downstream firm
is assumed to be a price-taker in the intermediate market.7 Given pS , it observes the current size of
the final market, and decides at which threshold yi to invest. To establish the equilibrium in (yi, pS)
we begin with the downstream firm’s optimization problem.
The value of a downstream firm that decides to invest when the market reaches size yi, given the
investment cost pS and the current market size y, is:
V (y, yi, pS) =
(
piM
r − αyi − pS
)(
y
yi
)β
, (3)
all y ≤ yi. The separated firm’s decision problem is maxyi≥y V (y, yi, pS), and the associated value-
maximizing investment trigger is yS (pS) =
β
β−1
r−α
piM
pS , which is increasing in pS , with yS (I) = y
∗.
6The term
(
y
yi
)β
in (1) reads as the expected discounted value, measured when Yt = y, of receiving one monetary
unit when Yt reaches yi for the first time. In the certainty case σ = 0, we have β =
r
α
and
(
y
yi
)β
= e−r(ti−t), which is
the standard continuous time discounting term.
7As in Tirole [28] it is “for simplicity” that we “assume that the manufacturer chooses the contract” (p. 173).
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That is, when it is charged the true input cost, the downstream firm invests at the same trigger as
the integrated firm.
At the current market size y, the upstream firm’s value is:
W (y, pS) = (pS − I)
(
y
yS(pS)
)β
, (4)
all y ≤ yS . Given yS (pS), the upstream firm’s decision problem is maxpS W (y, pS), leading to the
optimal price which is to set p∗S =
β
β−1I. In what follows, let y
∗
S ≡ yS(p∗S). We find:
Proposition 1 In the separated case, the optimum investment trigger and input price are:
y∗S =
(
β
β − 1
)2 r − α
piM
I and p∗S =
β
β − 1I. (5)
Substituting back (5) into (3-4), we obtain the firm values under separation:
V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S) =
βI
(β − 1)2
(
y
y∗S
)β
and W (y, p∗S) =
I
β − 1
(
y
y∗S
)β
. (6)
From (6) we obtain that
V (y,y∗S ,p
∗
S)
W(y,p∗S)
= ββ−1 , implying that the downstream value is higher than the
upstream’s. Using (2) we find that:
V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S) +W (y, p
∗
S)
V (y, y∗, I)
= (2β − 1) (β − 1)
β−1
ββ
, (7)
with f (β) ≡ (2β − 1) (β−1)β−1
ββ
∈ (2e , 1).8 Hence the industry value is lower under separation than
under integration, as is to be expected.
The decision problem is depicted in Figure 1 for specific parameter values (β = 2, I = piMr−α = 1,
and y = 1). The downstream isovalue curves are concave in (yi, pS) space, and the dashed line is the
locus of optimal responses to given upstream prices, yS (pS). For example, if the input is priced at
cost, the downstream firm’s value-maximizing investment trigger is y∗ = 2. The dashed line effectively
constitutes the constraint for the upstream firm’s optimization problem. The upstream isovalue curves
are convex in (yi, pS) space (the ordering of the curves follows from the monotonicity of the value
functions V and W in pS). Because p
∗
S maximizes W (y, pS), the point (y
∗
S , p
∗
S) lies at a tangency of
8The expression f (β) occurs several times in the paper and is characterized in Appendix A.2.
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an upstream isovalue with the locus yS (pS). The separated outcome is reached at (y
∗
S , p
∗
S) = (4, 2)
(point A), yielding V (1, y∗S , p
∗
S) =
1
8 and W (1, p
∗
S) =
1
16 . The industry value under separation is lower
than the integrated value, V (1, y∗, I) = 14 . We return in Section 3 to the gains that firms achieve by
moving to the contract curve.
yL, yF
W = 1/8
W = 0
W ∗ = 1/16
V ∗ = 1/8
V = 1/4
pS(y
∗)
I
p∗S
y∗ = 2 y∗S
pS
1
yS(pS)
A
B
Figure 1: Upstream and downstream isovalues (β = 2, y = I = piMr−α = 1). Point A describes the
separated equilibrium, in which the upstream firm charges p∗S = 2, and the downstream firm enters at
y∗S = 4. Points B describes a joint-value maximizing contract (see Section 3) in which the upstream
firm chooses the investment level y∗ = 2 and charges the input price pS (y∗) = 1.5 in order to maximize
its own value under the constraint that the downstream firm earns no less than V ∗ = 18 .
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2.3 The vertical distortion
Dixit, Pindyck, and Sødal [9] observe that there is a formal analogy between the real option model
presented in Section 2.1 and monopoly pricing with isoelastic demand. The isomorphism is obtained
by taking Q = aP−b as demand, and a constant marginal cost of production c, with P ≡ yi, a ≡ piMr−αyβ,
b ≡ β, c ≡ r−αpiM I. Thus, the optimal investment rule of the integrated firm (y∗ =
β
β−1
r−α
piM
I) has the
same form as a monopoly price. This analogy extends to the separated case that we have introduced
in Section 2.2, and is useful in order to understand the equilibrium. In comparison with the baseline
model of vertical externality9, the investment trigger substitutes for the final price as the downstream
decision variable so that the model is formally similar to the model of double marginalization.
The vertical externality may be gauged as follows. First note that both the input price and the
investment trigger are greater in the separated case than under integration (
p∗S
I =
y∗S
y∗ =
β
β−1).
10 Then,
for the upstream and downstream firm decisions, we can define the following magnitudes:
Lp ≡ p
∗
S − I
p∗S
=
1
β
, Ly ≡ y
∗
S − y∗
y∗S
=
1
β
. (8)
The expressions (8) have a similar form and interpretation as the Lerner index, which is generally
taken to measure market power. As noted above, β plays the same role as the elasticity of demand,
and fully characterizes Lp and Ly. As with double marginalization (where a more elastic demand
results in more competitive pricing), here a higher β results in more efficient input pricing and more
timely downstream entry. The degree of distortion therefore increases with a higher growth rate or
volatility, and decreases with a higher interest rate.
Note that the industry value under separation relative to integration, f (β) (see (7) above), de-
creases with β. Thus, although a higher α or σ or a lower r result in greater distortion in decisions,
they are also associated with less distortion in payoffs compared with integration. This is surprising
in appearance only, and similar contrasting effects exist in the successive monopolies model with con-
stant elasticity demand (with a highly inelastic demand, large distortions in decisions need not result
in large distortions in payoffs). To summarize:
9See Tirole [28] for a description of the externality identified by Spengler [27].
10In a model of hostile takeovers with sequential decisions, Lambrecht [16] derives a very similar result to the one
presented here. Notably, the expression for the additional mark-up on the target firm’s value has an analogous form
(merger timing is optimal, whereas hostile takeovers occur inefficiently late).
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Proposition 2 The industry value is lower under separation than under integration. The distortion
in firm decisions, as measured by Lp and Ly, is increasing in market growth rate and volatility and
decreasing in the interest rate, whereas the distortion in separated and integrated payoffs is decreasing
in market growth rate and volatility and increasing in the interest rate.
2.4 Sensitivity analysis
For the sensitivity analysis we successively consider changes in the interest rate, the growth rate and
volatility. Most parameters have effects that are typical for a real options framework, but there are
two notable exceptions. These exceptions arise because of the simultaneous presence of option effects
and the vertical distortion. Thus, an increase in the interest rate has an ambiguous effect on the
investment trigger, and an increase in volatility can reduce (rather than increase) firm value.
 Interest rate. With respect to the decision variables, we find first dp
∗
S
dr < 0. The effect on the
investment trigger is ambiguous. To see why, note that
dy∗S
dr =
∂y∗S
∂r +
∂y∗S
∂pS
dp∗S
dr , so that a change in
the interest rate has a direct and an indirect effect. All else equal, a higher interest rate leads the
downstream firm to delay its investment (
∂y∗S
∂r > 0), but also results in a lower input price (
dp∗S
dr < 0),
which in turn lowers the investment threshold. The latter effect can dominate, in particular when the
interest rate is sufficiently high.
As for firm values, letting V ∗ ≡ V (y, y∗S , p∗S) and W ∗ ≡W (y, p∗S), we find the following elasticity
expressions:
εV ∗/r = r
(
− β
r − α +
(
ln
y
y∗S
+
1
β
)
dβ
dr
)
< εW ∗/r = r
(
− β
r − α +
(
ln
y
y∗S
+
1
β − 1
)
dβ
dr
)
< 0, (9)
for all y ≤ y∗S . Consider the first of these. A change in the interest rate affects the value of the
downstream option, both directly and indirectly through the input price, so that dV
∗
dr =
∂V ∗
∂r +
∂V
∂pS
dp∗S
dr
(by the envelope theorem, ∂V∂yS drops out of this expression). In this case the negative direct (or
option) effect dominates the positive indirect (or vertical) one. The reasoning for the upstream firm
is formally similar.11
 Growth. The effect on the decision variables are dp
∗
S
dα > 0 and
dy∗S
dα > 0. For firm values, we find:
εV ∗/α = α
(
β
r − α +
(
ln
y
y∗S
+
1
β
)
dβ
dα
)
> εW ∗/α = α
(
β
r − α +
(
ln
y
y∗S
+
1
β − 1
)
dβ
dα
)
> 0, (10)
11Strictly speaking, only the downstream firm receives an option value. The upstream firm’s value results from dynamic
optimization, but is not an option value in the regular sense.
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for all y ≤ y∗S . Here dV
∗
dα =
∂V ∗
∂α +
∂V
∂pS
dp∗S
dα . A change in the growth rate results in a positive direct (or
option) effect, and in a smaller negative indirect (or vertical) effect. Again, the effect on the upstream
firm’s value is similar.
 Volatility. The effect of volatility on the decision variables is unambiguous, with dp
∗
S
dσ > 0 and
dy∗S
dσ > 0. However, the effect of volatility on firm values is ambiguous. We find:
εV ∗/σ = σ
(
ln
y
y∗S
+
1
β
)
dβ
dσ
, εW ∗/σ = σ
(
ln
y
y∗S
+
1
β − 1
)
dβ
dσ
, (11)
with εV ∗/σ positive (zero) if and only if y < (=)y
∗
S exp
(
− 1β
)
≡ yˇV , and εW ∗/σ positive (zero) if and
only if y < (=)y∗S exp
(
− 1β−1
)
≡ yˇW (note that yˇW < yˇV < y∗S for all β > 1). Thus, and in contrast
with typical real option models, firm value decreases with volatility near the investment threshold.
To see this better, consider the value of the upstream’s investment option. Similarly to above, the
effect of a change in volatility consists of a direct (or option) effect and an indirect (or vertical effect):
dV ∗
dσ
=
∂V ∗
∂σ︸︷︷︸
option effect (>0)
+
∂V
∂pS
dp∗S
dσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
vertical effect (<0)
. (12)
When volatility changes, the vertical effect in elasticity terms (equal to (1/σβ) (dβ/dσ)) is constant
over time, whereas the magnitude of the option effect (equal to (ln (y/y∗S) /σ) (dβ/dσ)) depends on the
current market size y. The option effect dominates at low market sizes, but as demand evolves and the
upstream firm nears its investment threshold, option value is relatively less important. Rather, the
firm’s payoff is then more sensitive to the vertical pricing distortion (which is increasing in volatility).
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S) over [0, y
∗
S ] for several levels of β.
Moreover, a similar ambiguity exists for the effect of volatility on upstream value, although the
market size thresholds at which εW ∗/σ turns negative is lower. A corollary is that there exists a
range of market sizes,
(
yˇV , yˇW
)
, over which the two firms have divergent preferences with respect to
volatility (greater volatility lowers upstream value and raises downstream value in this range). We
thus have: 
0 ≤ εW ∗/σ < εV ∗/σ if y ≤ yˇW ;
εW ∗/σ < 0 < εV ∗/σ if yˇ
W < y < yˇV ;
εW ∗/σ < εV ∗/σ ≤ 0 if yˇV ≤ y.
(13)
The following proposition summarizes the sensitivity results.
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Proposition 3 In the separated case, the impact of the interest rate and the demand process param-
eters on firm decisions and values are as follows:
(i) the investment threshold (y∗S) increases with market growth and volatility, whereas the effect of
the interest rate is ambiguous. The input price (p∗S) increases with market growth and volatility, and
decreases with the interest rate.
(ii) the upstream and downstream values at optimum (W ∗ and V ∗) are increasing in market growth
and decreasing in the interest rate. Greater volatility raises firm values when the market size is low
enough, and lowers firm values when market size approaches the investment threshold.
V ∗
σ1
σ2
σ3
y∗S(σ3) y
∗
S(σ2) y
∗
S(σ1)
Figure 2: Downstream value V ∗ = V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S), for y ≤ y∗S , with r−αpiM = I = 1, r = 0.2, α = 0.05 and
σ1 > σ2 > σ3 such that β(σ1) = 2 (solid), β(σ2) = 2.5 (dash), β(σ3) = 3.5 (dots). For large initial
market sizes, greater uncertainty (i.e., a lower β) reduces firm value.
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Together, Propositions 1, 2, and 3 describe a vertical externality arising with a downstream de-
mand evolving stochastically over time. The suboptimality feature of the separated case results from a
dynamic analog to a well-known static economic effect (double marginalization), and can occur when-
ever an input supplier with market power distorts the cost of the input, i.e. the strike price of the
downstream investment option, independently of the specifications of the model. To readers versed
in industrial organization, this intuitive result should come as no surprise, although we are not aware
of other work that draws this parallel. Moreover, the specification that is presented here allows us
to offer new insights on some aspects of supplier relationships, such as the relative weight of option
effects and vertical distortion.
3 Contractual Alternatives
It is well-established in industrial organization that various contractual alternatives or vertical re-
straints such as resale price maintenance, quantity discounts, and two-part tariffs, can allow a sepa-
rated structure to realize the integrated profit. Similar contractual mechanisms apply in the dynamic
setting, albeit with differences in implementation and interpretation. For simplicity, throughout the
section we fix the current time to be t = 0, assume that it is the upstream firm that sets the contract
which the downstream firm can accept or reject, and that such a contract is enforceable. Moreover,
the upstream firm cannot credibly commit not to sell the input at p∗S at a future date when the trigger
y∗S is reached. Thus, unless otherwise specified (see Section 3.2), the outside option of the downstream
firm is the value that it would realize in the separated case described in Section 2.2, which we denote
by V0 (y) ≡ V (y, y∗S , p∗S). Also, the contractual alternatives we examine require that the upstream firm
has some information about downstream demand. There are two polar cases, depending on whether
it observes the value of downstream demand at all times (Yt, all t), or only at one point in time (Y0).
Three contractual alternatives appear especially noteworthy.
3.1 State-dependent pricing
Suppose that the upstream firm continuously and verifiably observes the state of downstream demand.
It can then specify both the investment trigger and the input price, in a contract analogous to resale
price maintenance in the static vertical framework. By dictating the trigger that maximizes industry
value (yi = y
∗), the upstream firm can appropriate all the benefits above the downstream firm’s
12
reservation value. All that remains is to identify the input price pS (yi). Formally, for any y ≤ y∗, and
by slightly abusing notation to include the downstream investment trigger yi as an argument of the
function W ,12 the upstream firm’s problem is:
max
yi,pS
W (y, yi, pS) s.t. V (yi, yi, pS) ≥ V0 (yi) . (14)
The downstream participation constraint in (14) determines a maximum input price pS (yi) such that,
at the time the contract investment trigger yi is reached, the downstream firm prefers to invest imme-
diately rather than waiting until y∗S is reached and investing then at the price p
∗
S described in Section
2.2 (with pS (yi) defined by V (yi, yi, pS (yi)) = V (yi, y
∗
S , p
∗
S)). Total value maximization by the up-
stream firm yields an optimal contract (y∗i , p
∗
S(y
∗
i )) = (y
∗, pS (y∗)) with pS (y∗) =
β
β−1
(
1− (β−1)β−1
ββ
)
I
(with an infinite input price at all other times than when the trigger y∗ is reached for the first time).13
State-dependent pricing can be readily illustrated, as in Figure 1 above. With the parameter values
of the figure (β = 2, y = I = piMr−α = 1), the input supplier chooses yi = y
∗ = 2. The participation
constraint in (14) reduces to pS ≤ 32 , so the upstream firm charges p∗S = pS (2) = 32 . Point B describes
the optimal contract.
3.2 Dynamic pricing rule14
Even if it is unable to practice state dependent pricing, an upstream firm can still improve on a fixed
price contract if it has some information regarding the state of the stochastic process. Suppose that
although it cannot observe and contract on the state y for t > 0, the upstream firm observes and
can base its contract on Y0 by proposing a price schedule PS(t) that makes the input price grow over
time.15 Put informally, such pricing is effective because it counteracts the downstream firm’s tendency
to delay investment. We show that when volatility is low enough, the upstream firm approaches the
integrated value with a simple constant growth rate pricing rule.
12That is, we define W (y, yi, pS) = (pS − I)
(
y
yi
)β
, all y ≤ yi.
13As we assume for simplicity that bargaining power is distributed so the upstream captures all additional surplus, we
can omit the upstream participation constraint W (y, yi, pS) ≥W (y, y∗S , p∗S).
14We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this contractual alternative to us.
15The characterization of an optimal price schedule is a complex enough dynamic agency problem to be beyond our
scope here. For a general treatment of this question, the reader may refer to Kruse and Stack [15], who show that the
first-best outcome for the industry can in fact be implemented with a time-varying transfer.
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Assume that the upstream firm uses a pricing rule of the form PS (t) = P0e
γt, where P0 and γ
are non-negative and chosen at t = 0. In order for the downstream option to be well-defined, we
suppose that the rate of growth is capped (γ < r). Where there is no danger of confusion, we denote
the current price at time t by pS . Setting such a contract requires determining the initial level P0,
and therefore that the upstream observes the market state at the time the pricing policy is chosen.
Moreover, the upstream firm is assumed to have a form of myopic behavior in the sense that it sets the
pricing rule at t = 0 and does not subsequently revise it (e.g., it does not learn from the downstream’s
behavior over time). Finally, in contrast with the other contractual alternatives studied in this section,
the downstream firm’s reservation value is set to zero.16
Under these assumptions, the solution of the dynamic pricing problem runs as follows (see Section
A.4 of the appendix for the full derivation). To begin with, the downstream’s investment decision
(faced with the input price rule pS) has a known form
17 that is very similar to the one described in
Section 2.2. Given the input price growth rate (γ) set by the upstream firm, the optimal exercise
policy depends on the ratio of market size to input price ŷ ≡ ypS , and consists of investing when
this ratio reaches a trigger ŷ∗S =
β̂
β̂−1
r−α
piM
where β̂ ≡ β (α− γ, σ, r − γ).18 It therefore either invests
immediately if ŷ ≥ ŷ∗S , or waits until the trigger ŷ∗S is reached. A higher growth rate in the input
price reduces the deterministic advantage to waiting and hastens investment (
dŷ∗S
dγ < 0). As a result,
the upstream’s payoff at the decision time (t = 0) can be shown to be:
Ŵ (P0, γ) =
 P
−(β̂−1)
0
(
Y0
ŷ∗S
)β̂ − IP−β̂′0 (Y0ŷ∗S )β̂′ if Y0/P0 < ŷ∗S ,
P0 − I if Y0/P0 ≥ ŷ∗S ,
(15)
where β̂′ ≡ β (α− γ, σ, r). Note that in (15), β̂ (hence ŷ∗S) as well as β̂′ are functions of the decision
variables P0 and γ. The upstream firm’s optimization problem is thus:
max
P0,γ
Ŵ (P0, γ) s.t. V (ŷ, ŷ
∗
S , pS) ≥ 0, (16)
16The stationary price studied in Section 2.2 is a special case of the pricing rule (γ = 0). A downstream firm that
does not purchase the input at PS(t) is assumed not to purchase at all, whereas a downstream firm that rejects the other
contractual alternatives of this section (state-dependent price, option on the input) presumably can purchase the input
at p∗S .
17See McDonald and Siegel [21] and Dixit and Pindyck [8], Chapter 6.
18It is ratio y/pS that is relevant for the optimal investment decision here because the value of the downstream’s
investment option is homogeneous of degree one in market size and input price (y, pS).
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where the constraint binds in the deterministic case but not generally.
As Ŵ (P0, γ) is continuous in σ and in its arguments, when volatility is low (as σ ↓ 0), the optimal
constant-growth pricing rule p∗S converges to the solution of the deterministic case (σ = 0), as well as
to the state-dependent pricing rule. Moreover, in the deterministic case, the optimal pricing scheme
(P ∗0 , γ∗) =
(
piM
r−αY0, α
)
achieves the investment decision and outcome of the integrated firm. Thus,
when the scale parameter process is not too volatile, an input price that increases at a rate of about
α results in investment timing near the optimal threshold.
3.3 Option (or downpayment) on the input
A third contractual alternative is a policy that is reminiscent of a two-part tariff. As in Section 3.2,
the upstream firm is assumed to observe the initial state of the demand process, Y0, which need not be
verifiable here. However, it is not constrained to a spot transaction, and may collect a payment both
at the time of contracting and when the input is delivered. Then, the integrated value is realized by
means of an up-front option offered to the downstream firm on the specific input at a suitable exercise
price, pS . We know from Section 2.2 that the input buyer maximizes its private value by exercising the
option when Yt reaches yS (pS). The objective of the upstream supplier involves inducing the choice
of the efficient investment trigger by the input buyer, and appropriating the value in excess of the
downstream reservation level, which we assume to be the value from the separated case, i.e. V0(y).
This is done through an initial transfer payment, tS , which we interpret as the option premium, and
which also corresponds to a non-refundable deposit on the specific input.
Formally, the upstream problem is then:
max
pS ,tS
W (y, pS) + tS s.t. V (y, yS (pS) , pS)− tS ≥ V0(y), (17)
where the downstream participation constraint in (17) determines an upper bound on the transfer
payment. With the joint-value maximizing input price p∗S = I, the downstream firm chooses to invest
at yS (I) = y
∗, and value maximization by the upstream yields a transfer payment t∗S(y) such that the
downstream firm’s participation constraint in (17) is exactly satisfied.19 The optimal option contract
19As we assume the bargaining power is distributed so that the upstream firm captures all the surplus, the participation
constraint of the upstream firm (W (y, pS) + tS ≥W (y, p∗S)) can be omitted. Otherwise, t∗S constitutes an upper bound
on admissible option premiums.
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is
(
p∗S , t
∗
S (Y0)
)
= (I, V (Y0, y
∗, I)− V0(Y0)), which results in the integrated outcome.20 As with the
dynamic pricing problem discussed above, note that some information about the demand state at the
contracting date (Y0) is necessary in order to write the contract.
The aircraft industry provides an illustration of the results here and in Section 2. In Antikarov
and Copeland [1], the case of Airbus Industrie is carefully narrated by one of its marketing directors,
John Stonier. To begin with, manufacturers explicitly market option contracts to their customers,
who otherwise have a natural deferral option. In addition, aircraft manufacturers are economically
sophisticated and know that their customers differ with respect to the volatility of their revenue
streams (cf. p. 39, “The options were more valuable to some airlines than to others, and we could
segment the market in this way”). The marketing approach adopted by Airbus can thus be rationalized
by appealing to the dynamic vertical externality we have identified. The sale of options to customers
whose revenue stream exhibits greater volatility (those for whom the deferral option is more valuable)
is consistent with Proposition 2. It is exactly when volatility is high that the distortion associated with
dynamic double marginalization is greatest, therefore yielding more incentive to provide contractual
alternatives.
3.4 Example and synthesis
To illustrate, suppose that parameters are set as in Figure 1, (i.e., β = 2 and I = piMr−α = 1), so the
efficient investment trigger for the industry is y∗ = 2. Moreover, the current (initial) market size is
assumed to be Y0 = 1. Recall that the integrated value is V (1, y
∗, I) = 1/4. The different contractual
alternatives described in the section are then:
 State-dependent pricing. The efficient contract is straightforward to identify: (y∗, pS (y∗)) = (2, 1.5).
Note that this contractual alternative requires that the input supplier have more information than in
the two other contractual alternatives we study, as it must monitor the state of demand continuously
until the trigger y∗ is reached.
 Dynamic pricing rule. Keeping β = 2 as in the rest of the examples, we fix α = 0.04995, σ = 0.01,
and r = 0.1. The optimal pricing scheme is then (P ∗0 , γ∗) ' (0.99, 0.045) (note that the initial price
20The relative option premium (as a share of industry profit) is a function of β only: t
∗
S(y)/V (y, y
∗, I) = 1−
(
β−1
β
)β−1
.
Note that t
∗
S(y)/V (y, y
∗, I) is decreasing in σ.
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is lower than the investment cost I in this case). This results in firm values Ŵ (ŷ, pS) ' 0.18 and
V̂ (ŷ, ŷ∗, pS) ' 0.04 whose sum is between the industry values under integration and separation (3/16).
 Option on input. The efficient contract is:
(
p∗S , t
∗
S (Y0)
)
= (1, 0.125) where the first term is either
interpreted as a strike price or a payment upon completion, and the second as an option price or
as a downpayment. Of the alternatives that we examine, this contractual alternative has a lower
informational requirement (Y0) and achieves the efficient outcome.
The following proposition summarizes our results concerning contractual alternatives.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the upstream firm chooses the contract and has some information re-
garding market size. Then, if the upstream firm can observe and contract on the state Yt, it induces
efficient investment timing and the integrated value. If the upstream firm can only observe the initial
demand state Y0, then:
(i) it improves upon constant pricing by using a constant growth rate rule P (t) = P0e
γt and, as
volatility approaches zero, it approaches efficient investment timing and the integrated value;
(ii) by selling an option (downpayment) on the input with strike price I it induces efficient investment
timing and the integrated value.
As has been noted, these alternatives are similar to known vertical restraints in industrial eco-
nomics. When such alternatives are not available to the upstream firm, the presence of downstream
competition may act as a substitute. The earlier investment implied by the resulting race to preempt
in the downstream industry actually fully counteracts the double marginalization distortion for the
first firm that invests.
4 Downstream Duopoly with an Upstream Supplier
In this section we build on the analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole [10] (preemption), and (inter alia)
Smets [25], Grenadier [11], Weeds [29], Mason and Weeds [20], Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux [2],
Huisman, Kort, and Thijssen [14] (preemption under uncertainty)21, by integrating the upstream
decision and a downstream preemption race.
21A comprehensive discussion of these contributions can be found in Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [7].
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We have established above that, in the separated case, and in the absence of sufficient contractual
instruments, investment occurs too late from an industry standpoint. However it is well known that in
preemption races the first firm invests too early, leading to rent dissipation. In this section, we study
the interaction of these two effects. In particular, we show that the race to preempt downstream can
counteract the double marginalization distortion, and thereby functions as a substitute for the vertical
restraints examined in Section 3.
The structural assumptions are those of Section 2.2, except that on the intermediate market the
upstream firm faces not one but two potential downstream buyers, that decide non-cooperatively when
to enter the final market. Thus, as in Section 2 we once again suppose that the upstream firm does
not observe Yt at any date and does not practice the contractual alternatives described in Section 3.
Moreover, the upstream is assumed not to learn from the decisions of downstream firms.22 However,
it may charge different prices at different dates (intertemporal price discrimination is allowed).
With these assumptions the flow profits depend on the number of active firms. Now Yt describes
an industry-wide shock, and flow profits are YtpiM (monopoly profit) if a single firm has entered
the downstream market, and YtpiD (duopoly profit) for each firm if both have invested. We assume
0 < piD ≤ piM , reflecting either the usual case (piD < piM/2) or strong spillovers/complementarities
(piD ≥ piM/2). A key parameter in this section is the ratio piM/piD, which we take as a measure of
competition in the product market, and which is also viewed as an indicator of first-mover advantage
in the downstream investment game (Pawlina and Kort [23]).
4.1 Equilibrium of the pricing and entry game
The main result of the section is the characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the pricing and entry
game played by the upstream and downstream firms. In duopoly entry games, two types of equilibrium
may arise, namely one in which firms invest sequentially (the “preemption” equilibrium, where firms
are equally likely to invest first), and equilibria in which firms invest simultaneously. However in our
model, only equilibria of the first type arise (see proof of Proposition 5 below), so we do not discuss
the second type any further here.
22That is, it does not infer Yt from downstream entry decisions, either because it has myopic behavior, or because
it observes only the degree of competition in the downstream market (as measured by the ratio piM/piD) and not the
downstream flow profit levels.
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The upstream firm’s strategy consists of two prices pL and pF . This is because it is assumed to
condition the spot price on its information in the intermediate product market (the number of inputs
demanded). In what follows pL denotes the spot price charged to the first firm to invest (the “leader”),
and pF denotes the spot price for the second firm (the “follower”). Thus, the choice of input price is
closed loop (without commitment as to future prices), and the upstream firm charges a constant price
over time until the first entry occurs, and another constant price over time thereafter.
Downstream firms are assumed to be price takers in the intermediate market. Their strategic
space therefore effectively consists of two entry thresholds yP and yF . Here yP denotes the preemption
trigger, which is the market size at which the first of the two firms enters, and yF denotes the follower’s
investment trigger at which the second firm enters. The dynamics of industry structure downstream
therefore consist of three successive phases, namely no firm, monopoly starting when market size
reaches yP for the first time, and duopoly after it hits yF . The reader may note that the strategies
we describe are shorthand for the “simple” strategies defined in Fudenberg and Tirole [10], and more
recently by Huisman, Kort, and Thijssen [14], although as such they are sufficient for the equilibrium
characterization that we provide.23
Our assumptions are such that everything happens as if firms played the following four-stage game:
• Stage 1: the upstream firm chooses the first input price (pL);
• Stage 2: downstream firms observe pL and engage in a preemption race that determines the first
entry threshold (yP );
• Stage 3: the upstream firm chooses the second input price (pF );
• Stage 4: the remaining downstream firm observes pF and chooses the second entry threshold
(yF ).
In order to determine the equilibrium of the pricing and entry game, it suffices to determine the
input prices (pL, pF ) and the two investment triggers (yP , yF ). In preemption equilibrium, the identity
23The full specification of the investment game is rather technical, but this is necessary in order to properly deal with
“ties” in which both downstream firms seek to invest simultaneously. Thus, the true strategy space of downstream firms
consists of a pair of real-valued functions describing both investment threshold and investment “intensity” (see Huisman,
Kort, and Thijssen [14]). However, this does not have a direct bearing on the form of the equilibrium investment
thresholds derived in our model.
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of the leader and follower are indeterminate, in that either firm effectively invests first, with equal
probability.
Proceeding by backward induction, once the leader has invested, the subgame between the up-
stream firm and the follower is identical to that in Section 2.2. When the current market size is y, the
value of a follower that invests at a threshold yF ≥ y and pays a price pF is:
F (y, yF , pF ) =
(
piD
r − αyF − pF
)(
y
yF
)β
. (18)
Then, the optimal second spot price for the upstream firm is p∗F =
β
β−1I, and the optimal follower
investment threshold is y∗F =
(
β
β−1
)2
r−α
piD
I. Compared with the case where the specific input is
produced internally (pF = I), the follower invests at a level of y that is
β
β−1 times higher.
Remark 1 F (y, y∗F , p
∗
F ) does not depend on (pL, yP ).
Indeed, what the firm takes into account when it chooses an investment trigger, as a follower, is
the profit flow it may expect in the future. This flow is not impacted by the investment cost of the
leader, nor by its exact investment date.
To determine the preemption threshold yP , given pL, it is necessary to refer to the value of a
firm that invests immediately at the current market size y, given that its rival invests optimally as a
follower. Let L (y, pL) denote this value, which has a different form from the V (·) expressions in the
rest of the paper:
L (y, pL) =
piM
r − αy − pL −
piM − piD
r − α y
∗
F
(
y
y∗F
)β
, (19)
all y ≤ y∗F . Although this function is commonly used in preemption models, it is also useful to consider
a somewhat more general expression of (19), which is L˜ (y, yL, yF , pL) =
(
piM
r−αyL − pL
)(
y
yL
)β −
piM−piD
r−α yF
(
y
yF
)β
, all y ≤ yL ≤ yF . The function L˜ (y, yL, yF , pL) measures the value, at the current
market size y, of a firm that is free to invest at the future trigger yL as a leader with a follower that
invests at yF .
24 We have L (y, pL) = L˜ (y, yL, y
∗
F , pL) when the constraint yL ≡ y is imposed.
Remark 2 arg maxyL L˜ (y, yL, y
∗
F , I) = {y∗}.
In other words, when it incurs the “true” cost of investment pL = I, a firm that is free to choose
yL invests at the same date as in the integrated case (with a single firm). This is another illustration
of the “myopic” behavior as coined by Leahy [19].
24See Reinganum [24].
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The analysis of the investment game based on the functions (18) and (19) closely follows that
of existing models. The threshold yP , which is defined by L(yP (pL) , pL) = F (yP (pL), y
∗
F , p
∗
F ), is a
function of pL. We define y
∗
P ≡ yP (p∗L), where p∗L denotes the upstream supplier’s value-maximizing
price. We find:
Proposition 5 In the separated case with two downstream firms, there is a unique equilibrium char-
acterized by:
(i) downstream triggers : y∗P =
β
β − 1
r − α
piM
I, y∗F =
(
β
β − 1
)2 r − α
piD
I, (20)
(ii) upstream prices : p∗L =
(
1−∆
(
β,
piM
piD
))
p∗F , p
∗
F =
β
β − 1I, (21)
with ∆
(
β, piMpiD
)
≡
(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)1−β − ( ββ−1 piMpiD )−β ∈ (0, (β−1)β−1ββ ).
There are two salient features in this proposition. First, the upstream firm induces the first
downstream firm to enter at the efficient threshold (y∗P = y
∗). The intuition behind this is as follows.
In a preemption equilibrium, rent equalization implies that, for any investment cost chosen upstream,
including pL = I, the leader’s value is pegged on the follower payoff F (y, y
∗
F , p
∗
F ). The latter value
does not depend on pL (Remark 1). By raising the price pL above I, the upstream firm increases
the cost of leading the sequence of investments, and thereby raises the preemption equilibrium trigger
yP (pL). It also appropriates any additional monetary gain on top of the value L˜ (y, yP (pL) , y
∗
F , pL) =
F (y, y∗F , p
∗
F ) retained by the downstream leader. Therefore, the supplier’s best strategy is to maximize
the joint value of the two vertically related units, by setting yP equal to the investment trigger y
∗.
This is the same investment trigger as the one chosen by the leader when it incurs the “true” cost I
(Remark 2). A noteworthy feature of the specification with vertical separation and two downstream
firms, compared with similar real option games, is that the solution in the preemption scenario is
analytic. The closed-form expression of y∗P facilitates the comparative statics, which are consistent
with the interpretation of the model given in Section 2.3. As for the follower’s investment threshold
y∗F , recall that it is chosen analogously to the separated case (like y
∗
S in Section 2.2).
Second, the way that the upstream firm induces entry at the efficient threshold is by discounting
the input for the first downstream firm, thus exacerbating the preemption race. The level of the
discount ∆
(
β, piMpiD
)
results from the interplay of two effects, option effects (β) on the one hand, and
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downstream competition effects (piM/piD) on the other. Intuitively, when downstream competition is
severe (high piM/piD), preemption leads firms to invest earlier, and it is less necessary to discount the
first input. Similarly, when option effects are substantial (low β) so that firms tend to enter relatively
late, it is necessary to discount the first input more in order to induce efficient entry. These remarks
are captured in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 For all admissible parameter values, the discount is decreasing in β and piMpiD :
d∆
(
β, piMpiD
)
dβ
< 0,
d∆
(
β, piMpiD
)
dpiMpiD
< 0. (22)
More can be said about the equilibrium values of decision variables in Proposition 5 regarding
comparative statics. For example, the price elasticities with respect to the parameters of the stochastic
process have tractable forms that are easily ranked (εp∗F /β < εp
∗
L/β
< 0 and εp∗F /
piM
piD
= 0 < εp∗L/
piM
piD
, on
this see the appendix, Section A.6.1).
As we have seen, a key prediction of the model is that the upstream supplier induces an efficient
investment threshold for the first firm that is identical to the integrated case, analogously to a “no
discrimination at the top” result. These points are illustrated in Figure 3 for specific parameter values.
The two solid curves refer to the separated case. The quasi concave one represents L˜ (y, yL, y
∗
F , p
∗
L),
that is the value of the leader as a function of yL, and measured at a given y (specifically, y = 1)
provided that the follower invests at the optimal threshold y∗F , and for an upstream value-maximizing
price p∗L (with β = 2, I = r − α = piM = 1, piD = 12). The other solid curve is a graph of the follower
value F (y, yF , p
∗
F ), which has the same expression as in (18). Note that, when y = y
∗
F , the leader
value is higher since p∗L =
13
8 < 2 = p
∗
F . The preemption threshold y
∗
P is determined by the condition
that firms are indifferent at that point between investing as a leader or waiting to invest as a follower.
In this figure, the dashed curve represents the upstream firm’s optimization problem. It describes the
reference (or “true”) leader value, based on the actual investment cost I (i.e., pL = I) for all possible
yL ≤ y∗F , and for yF = y∗F (i.e., pF = p∗F > I). This is the graph of L˜ (y, yL, y∗F , I), which reaches a
maximum when yL = y
∗.
Consider now the upstream value in the preemption equilibrium of Proposition 5, that is
W˜ (y, p∗L, p
∗
F ) = (p
∗
L − I)
(
y
yP
(
p∗L
))β + (p∗F − I)( yy∗F
)β
. (23)
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y∗Fy˜Fy
∗
P = y
∗
L˜(1, y∗, y∗F , p
∗
L)
y˜P
yL, yF
L˜(1, y˜P , y˜F , 1)
L˜(1, y∗, y∗F , 1)
L˜(1, yL, y˜F , 1)
L˜(1, yL, y
∗
F , 1)
L˜(1, yL, y
∗
F , p
∗
L)
F (1, yF , 1)
F (1, yF , p
∗
F )
Figure 3: Leader and follower values at current market size y = 1 as a function of investment triggers
yL, yF (with β = 2, I = r − α = piM = 1, piD = 12). The preemption trigger y∗P = y∗ in the separated
case maximizes the reference leader value (that is, L˜(1, yL, y
∗
F , 1)), and is greater than the trigger
under preemption when both downstream firms face the true investment cost. By charging p∗L > 1,
the upstream firm appropriates the value differential L˜ (1, y∗, y∗F , 1) − L˜ (1, y∗, y∗F , p∗L). By charging
p∗F > 1, it also earns the difference F (1, y
∗
F , 1)− F (1, y∗F , p∗F ) .
This value can be visualized in Figure 3 by reinterpreting each term on the right hand side of the
equality sign in (23) as follows. On the one hand, the supplier chooses pL, shifting the leader value
function, to maximize the difference between the reservation value that must be given to the leader
and the reference leader value (with the true cost I) at the preemption trigger yP (pL). By charging
exactly p∗L > I, so that the leader invests at y
∗
P = yP (p
∗
L) = y
∗, the supplier appropriates the value
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differential
L˜ (y, y∗, y∗F , I)− L˜ (y, y∗, y∗F , p∗L) = (p∗L − I)
(
y
yP
(
p∗L
))β . (24)
In addition, the upstream supplier earns the difference between the value that the follower would
earn as an integrated firm, and the value it earns as a separate entity, with yF = y
∗
F in both cases.
Formally, by charging p∗F > I, the supplier appropriates
F (y, y∗F , I)− F (y, y∗F , p∗F ) = (p∗F − I)
(
y
y∗F
)β
. (25)
The magnitudes (24) and (25) are represented by the vertical arrows in the figure.
Finally, Figure 3 also shows the investment triggers that arise in the standard investment model,
or equivalently with two integrated downstream firms (i.e., pL = pF = I), which are denoted y˜P and
y˜F respectively. We discuss this comparison further in Section 4.2 below.
Extension: exclusive dealing
Interesting outcomes can arise if some of the assumptions of the pricing and entry game are
relaxed. For simplicity, assume that downstream complementarities are not too strong (piM/piD > 2),
so the entry of a second firm reduces flow profits for the industry. Then, instead of supposing that
the upstream firm cannot commit to future prices, suppose that it can credibly threaten to charge
pF = ∞, or (equivalently) that it can add an enforceable exclusivity clause when it sells the input
to the first firm. Then, by arguments similar to above, the upstream can induce efficient timing for
the first investment (y∗) and capture the integrated value by charging pexclL = V (y, y
∗, I). To see this,
consider Figure 3 again. With exclusive dealing, the relevant follower payoff F (y, y∗F ,∞) tends to the
horizontal axis asymptotically (y∗F =∞). The supplier then appropriates the value differential, which
is now simply L˜ (y, y∗,∞, I), and is greater than W˜ (y, p∗L, p∗F ) if piM/piD > 2. The combination of
(potential) downstream preemption and exclusive dealing constitutes an effective vertical restraint in
this case.
4.2 Comparison of industry structures
We compare our model with three relevant benchmarks: the industry optimum, the standard preemp-
tion framework, as well as the bilateral monopoly model of Section 2.2.25
25As is common in this literature our objective here is descriptive rather than normative, so we focus on industry value
and leave aside the characterization of the consumer surplus.
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 Industry optimum. The first benchmark we consider is the industry optimum, in which the entry
thresholds are chosen so as to maximize the joint value L˜ (y, y1, y2, I) + F (y, y2, I) over (y1, y2) ∈
[y,∞) × [max {y, y1} ,∞). The industry value at optimum is trivially greater than the one realized
in the scenario of Proposition 5. There are two main subcases to consider, depending on the degree
of competition piM/piD. To begin with, note that in all cases, the timing of the first investment
is the same in our preemption scenario and in the industry optimum (y∗P = y
∗
1 = y
∗).26 Next,
when the degree of competition is large (piM/piD ≥ 2), the second entry exerts a negative externality
on industry payoffs, the industry optimum involves a single downstream investment (y∗2 = ∞), and
necessarily the second investment occurs too early under preemption. When the degree of competition
is small (piM/piD < 2), the second investment exerts a positive externality (because of downstream
complementarities). In that case, the second investment under preemption may occur either too early
or too late (y∗F ≶ y∗2 =
β
β−1
r−α
2piD−piM I), depending on the primitives of the model (β (piM/piD − 1) ≶ 1).
Two independent effects are involved: with double marginalization, a larger option effect (low β) leads
the second firm to delay too much, whereas more complementarities (low piM/piD) generate a greater
positive externality of the follower’s entry on industry value.
 Standard preemption. We know from existing models with similar specifications that, in a preemp-
tion equilibrium without any upstream mark-up, the leader invests first at y˜P , which is strictly less
than the efficient threshold y∗. Then the follower invests at y˜F = ββ−1
r−α
piD
I. Note that in Figure 3, the
two dotted curves represent the leader and follower payoff functions L˜ (y, yL, y˜F , I) and F (y, yF , I)
respectively. It is straightforward to check that entry occurs generally earlier in standard preemp-
tion (y˜P < y
∗
P < y˜F < y
∗
F ). The comparison of equilibrium values over the two industry structures
hinges on several effects and is ambiguous. With respect to industry value, the first firm’s entry is
less efficient in the standard preemption model, but the second firm’s entry can be more efficient.
Moreover, industry value is greater with a separate input supplier when option effect is low (high β)
or downstream competition is tough (high piM/piD), but standard preemption can dominate as well.
 Bilateral monopoly. A final comparison is with the bilateral monopoly case that we studied in section
2.2. With respect to investment thresholds, the only relevant comparison is for the first investment
(y∗P = y
∗ < y∗S), so the first firm’s entry is more efficient with downstream preemption. With respect to
industry value, the presence of a second firm affects the structure and potential surplus of the industry,
either positively or negatively (as piM/piD ≶ 2), hindering direct comparison. Again, the comparison
of industry structures with respect to value is ambiguous. For a small option effect (high β) and tough
26Note that L˜ (y, y1, y2, I) is separable in y1 and y2 (see also Remark 2 above).
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competition (high piM/piD), preemption with an input supplier dominates bilateral monopoly, but the
opposite can also hold.
To summarize:
Proposition 7 Entry thresholds and industry value are such that:
(i) for the first entry threshold, y˜P < y
∗
P = y
∗
1 = y
∗ < y∗S, and for the second entry threshold (when
defined), y˜F < y
∗
F , y˜F < y
∗
2 and y
∗
F ≶ y∗2 when β (piM/piD − 1) ≶ 1.
(ii) the industry structure {preemption with upstream} may either dominate or be dominated by the
two alternative structures {bilateral monopoly} and {standard preemption}. For large enough
(
β, piMpiD
)
,
{preemption with upstream} is an optimal structure for the industry.
The objective of this section has been to describe a complex industrial structure, in which an
upstream sells an input to two successive entrants. Entry and pricing decisions in this structure
reflect the interplay of two conflicting mechanisms: preemption (which leads downstream firms to enter
“too early”) and separation (which leads them to enter “too late”). Taken in isolation, each of these
mechanisms is detrimental to industry value, either via rent dissipation, or via double marginalization.
But in the three-firm structure, the two can balance out and yield greater industry value. Notably,
by Proposition (7), when downstream competition is tough (large piM/piD), preemption is severe and
leads to entry much too early by the first firm. Moreover, it is exactly when downstream competition
is tough that the second firm’s entry reduces industry flow profits (the industry optimum is for a
single downstream firm to be active in this case). Yet, balanced with the upstream’s pricing decision,
preemption among downstream firms then has the effect of a vertical restraint, and is sufficiently
effective as such for greater industry value to result.
5 An Example: Investments in the Vaccine Industry
In developing the model presented here, our thinking was guided by an example of investment in
production facilities for a new vaccine against dengue fever that illustrates many of the theoretical
aspects. Dengue is a disease caused by any of four closely related virus serotypes transmitted by
mosquitoes. It strikes people with low levels of immunity, with symptoms that include intense joint
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and muscle pain, headache, nausea, and fever. The most severe form of the disease is the dengue
hemorrhagic fever. Although it occurs mostly in Asian and Latin American countries, where it is a
leading cause of hospitalization, the disease spreads to new parts of the globe each year, including
countries such as Australia and the United States (Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Texas-
Mexico border, Pacific islands, and most recently Florida).27
To address this problem, one or more vaccines are due to arrive over the next years. With
clinical studies reaching their final phase, Sanofi Pasteur, the vaccines division of Sanofi SA, was
the first to launch the construction of a new plant north of Lyon (France) in 2009, with an annual
capacity of 100 million doses per year. The total investment amounts to $477 million (see Carroll
[4]). The main facility, which concentrates the firm’s production technology, has been specifically
designed for the processing of the novel vaccine. In line with the irreversible investment framework,
most components of the expenditure, including fees and wages, capital amortization, and the costs
for the safety and quality qualification procedure, are unrecoverable. The equipment is sourced on
an intermediate market from specialized input providers, and represents on the order of 35-40% of
the plant construction cost. The customized lyophilisators, which use liquid nitrogen refrigeration for
freeze drying operations, constitute a central piece of equipment in the mass production process. The
suppliers of pharmaceutical freeze drying technology are highly concentrated, suggesting the possibility
of market power. In Europe, lyophilisators are supplied by firms such as Usifroid, a subsidiary of Telstar
SA which recently claimed a French market share of 80% in freeze drying equipment solutions for the
pharmaceutical industry. In 2009, GlaxoSmithKline Plc (GSK), another leading vaccine producer,
announced that it would develop and manufacture another dengue vaccine with a Brazilian partner.28
GSK is thus likely to also invest in additional production capacities in the foreseeable future, at some
point in time that will depend on demand forecasts.
The potential demand for the vaccines is clearly growing, though future levels are uncertain. The
number of reported cases, as measured annually, is a simple indicator of the magnitude of future
demand.29 According to the World Health Organization (WHO) “[a]n estimated 2.5 billion people
live in over 100 endemic countries and areas where dengue viruses can be transmitted. Up to 50
million infections occur annually with 500,000 cases of dengue hemorrhagic fever and 22,000 deaths
mainly among children”. The number of countries reporting cases is another demand indicator. The
27See World Health Organization [30] and Center for Disease Control [5].
28Sources on Telstar’s market shares in Europe and GSK’s project to manufacture a vaccine for dengue fever are
http://www.telstar-lifesciences.com/en/ and http://www.gsk.com/media/pressreleases/2009, respectively.
29The issue of demand forecasts for new vaccines is discussed thoroughly in Center for Global Development [6].
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WHO indicates that “[p]rior to 1970, only 9 countries had experienced cases of dengue hemorrhagic
fever; since then the number has increased more than 4-fold and continues to rise”.30
This real-world situation, where firms’ choice of investment timing depends on the cost of a key
equipment, which is necessary in order to serve a growing though uncertain demand, and is delivered
by an upstream supplier with market power, is thus emblematic of the many market cases captured
by our model specifications.
To flesh out the idea that double marginalization leads to delayed entry, note that the demand for
the vaccine can be proxied by the number of reporting countries, insofar as governments constitute
firms’ effective clients in this industry. As a rough approximation, for the forty year period up to
2005, this demand is fit by a geometric Brownian motion with drift and volatility parameters α = 0.05
and σ = 0.21.31 The upstream mark-up and downstream delay are measured by Lerner-based market
power indices that we have defined (Lp and Ly in (8)).
32 Letting the cost of capital range from 10
to 20 percent consistently with a moderate to high premium on historical stock market returns, these
measures range from 0.3 to 0.6. A back of the envelope calibration exercise thus suggests that the
dynamic double marginalization phenomenon identified in Section 2.2 could result in a downstream
firm like Sanofi SA setting an investment threshold up to two or three times greater than the industry
optimum.
On the other hand, another salient feature of this case is rival firm GlaxoSmithKline Plc’s impend-
ing entry in the market. To the extent that, as seems likely, Sanofi SA could anticipate its rival’s arrival
into the market, the main result of Section 4 relating to the downstream duopoly case (Proposition
5) suggests that despite any upstream mark-up on the investment cost, Sanofi’s entry should occur
at the efficient point from the standpoint of the industry as a whole. Exactly where the truth lies
between the two extremes predicted by the bilateral monopoly and downstream preemption scenarios
we study, as well as the comparison with the social optimum, is a question that we leave open.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied investment timing when firms depend on an outside supplier to provide a
discrete input (e.g., a key equipment), developing a dynamic version of a heretofore static model. The
30Source: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/dengue/impact/en/index.html.
31Data available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/dengue/denguenet/en/.
32These measures range from 0 (no distortion) to 1 (full distortion).
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upstream firm’s mark-up depends on the stochastic process followed by downstream flow profits. A
vertical distortion arises because the upstream firm’s pricing induces the downstream firm to delay the
exercise of its investment option. The distortion, measured by a Lerner index, increases with market
growth and volatility and decreases in the interest rate. Downstream firm value is more sensitive to the
market growth rate and the interest rate than upstream firm value, and in contrast with the standard
real option framework, greater volatility decreases firm values near the exercise threshold. Aside from
forcing efficient investment timing directly when it can contract on the state of final demand, an input
supplier that knows the initial demand state can approach the integrated value with a simple dynamic
pricing rule when volatility is low, or, if such contracts are feasible, induce optimal investment timing
by means of an option on the input, as aircraft manufacturers do. Otherwise, the presence of a second
downstream firm results in a preemption race and acts as a substitute for vertical restraints. The
input is then sold to the downstream leader at a discount that reflects the interaction of the option
effect with both vertical effects (double marginalization) and horizontal effects (preemption). The first
firm invests optimally as a result, and industry value is higher than in comparable industry structures
when option effects are low or when downstream competition is high.
The model developed in this paper may be viewed alternatively as an extension of the existing
real options literature, or as the extension of the classic industrial organization analysis of vertical
relationships to a stochastic dynamic setting. Relatively to other work, we hope to have shown how
not only preemption races, but also other insights of industrial economics fit naturally with option
theory, that is to say that an integrated vision of firm investment exists at the intersection of economics
and finance, which likely involves options and games.
The model we study rests on several assumptions that may be relaxed. One direct extension is
to allow for upstream competition. If suppliers compete in prices and there is a single downstream
firm, then the integrated optimum is restored. On the other hand, in an industry with two upstream
and two downstream firms, upstream competition presumably results in a standard preemption race
downstream, and the leader invests too early. Also, a qualitative prediction of the model is that the
first input is sold at a discount under downstream duopoly, but learning effects which decrease the
upstream firm’s production cost for the second input supplied, could reduce the apparent discount
that is offered to the leader. Many of the key results hold if demand is taken to follow a process
other than geometric Brownian motion, but we have not studied the consequences of weakening our
assumptions on the cost of capital, which could differ between firms, for instance. Our analysis has
adhered to the classical assumption that the contract terms are decided by the upstream firm, and one
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could also envisage that it is the downstream firms that have market power in the input market, and
therefore write the contract. Finally, our focus has been on describing firm choices and firm profits,
and a broader analysis would integrate a consumer welfare measure as well.
A Appendix
A.1 Sensitivity of β to r, α and σ
The derivatives of β with respect to the growth and volatility parameters α and σ arise throughout
the paper, and have the following expressions:
dβ
dr
=
1(
β − (12 − ασ2 ))σ2 > 0, dβdα = −β(β − (12 − ασ2 ))σ2 < 0, dβdσ = −2 (r − αβ)(β − (12 − ασ2 ))σ3 ≤ 0. (26)
With respect to the sign of the latter expression, note that r ≥ αβ, with equality only if σ = 0.
Moreover, we have dβdr = − 1β dβdα . 
A.2 Behavior of f (β)
We use f (β) ≡ (2β − 1) (β−1)β−1
ββ
several times in the paper. As f is continuous on [1,∞) and
lim1+ (β − 1)β−1 = 1, f(1) = 1. To show that lim∞ f (β) = 2e , note that f (β) =
(
1 + ββ−1
)(
1− 1β
)β
and recall that lim∞
(
1− 1β
)β
= e−1. Finally, f ′ (β) =
(
2− (2β − 1) ln ββ−1
)
(β−1)β−1
ββ
. Define x ≡
β
β−1 ∈ (1,∞) so after substituting and rearranging f ′ (β) has the sign of Γ (x) ≡ 2 (x− 1)−(x+ 1) lnx.
Then lim1 Γ(x) = 0 and Γ
′(x) = 1 − lnx − 1x . Since lnx > xx−1 , Γ′(x) < −x
2+x−1
x(x−1) < 0, so Γ(x) is
negative on [1,∞) and therefore f ′ (β) < 0. 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (Sensitivity analysis in bilateral monopoly)
A.3.1 Decision variables (y∗S , p
∗
S)
Investment threshold:
dy∗S
dr
= y∗S
(
1
r − α −
2
β (β − 1)
dβ
dr
)
≶ 0, (27)
dy∗S
dα
= −y∗S
(
1
r − α +
2
β (β − 1)
dβ
dα
)
(28)
=
y∗S
r − α
1
2 +
α
σ2
β − (12 − ασ2 ) > 0, (29)
dy∗S
dσ
= − 2y
∗
S
β (β − 1)
dβ
dσ
> 0. (30)
To establish that
dy∗S
dr has an ambiguous sign (negative for low r and positive otherwise), note that it
has the sign of Θ (r) ≡ β (β − 1) (β − (12 − ασ2 ))σ2 − 2 (r − α). We find that Θ is a convex function
of r, as Θ′′(r) =
2α
2
σ4
+3 2r−α
σ2
+1(
β−
(
1
2
− α
σ2
))3
σ2
> 0 (since α < r). Also, at r = α, Θ(α) = 0, Θ′(α) = −1, and
limr→∞Θ (r) =∞. We conclude that Θ (r) = 0 has a unique root in (α,∞).
Input price:
For r, α, and σ we have
dp∗S
d· = − I(β−1)2
dβ
d· , where
dβ
d· is given by (26) above.
A.3.2 Firm values (V ∗,W ∗)
We successively focus on α and r only since the effect of a change in σ on V ∗ and W ∗ follows directly
from the expressions given in the text.
Growth:
It is useful to begin by signing dW
∗
dα . After simplification, computations yield, for all y ≤ y∗S :
dW (y, p∗S)
dα
=
(
β
r − α +
(
1
β − 1 + ln
y
y∗S
)
dβ
dα
)
W (y, p∗S) (31)
≥
(
β
r − α +
1
β − 1
dβ
dα
)
W (y, p∗S) . (32)
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Thus,
dW(y,p∗S)
dα > 0 if Λ (α, r, σ) ≡ (β − 1)
(
β − (12 − ασ2 ))σ2−(r − α) > 0. Taking r = α, Λ (α, α, σ) =
0, and dΛ(α,r,σ)dr = (β − 1)
(
β − (12 − ασ2 ))−1 > 0. Therefore, dW(y,p∗S)dα > 0 for all admissible parameter
values.
For the sign of dV
∗
dα , similarly after simplification, computations yield, for all y ≤ y∗S :
dV (y, y∗S , p
∗
S)
dα
=
(
β
r − α +
(
1
β
+ ln
y
y∗S
)
dβ
dα
)
V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S) (33)
≥
(
β
r − α +
1
β
dβ
dα
)
V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S) . (34)
As we have established
dW(y,p∗S)
dα > 0 and since
1
β
dβ
dα >
1
β−1
dβ
dα , we have
dV (y,y∗S ,p
∗
S)
dα > 0 for all admissible
parameter values.
Interest rate:
We begin with dVdr . For all y ≤ y∗S :
dV (y, y∗S , p
∗
S)
dr
=
(
− β
r − α +
(
1
β
+ ln
y
y∗S
)
dβ
dr
)
V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S) , (35a)
= −
(
β
r − α +
1
β
(
1
β
+ ln
y
y∗S
)
dβ
dα
)
V (y, y∗S , p
∗
S) , (35b)
= −
(
β
r − αV (y, y
∗
S , p
∗
S) +
1
β
dV (y, y∗S , p
∗
S)
dα
)
< 0, (35c)
where the second equality follows from dβdr = − 1β dβdα , and the final inequality from the result
dV (y,y∗S ,p
∗
S)
dα >
0 established above.
Next, we evaluate dWdr . For all y ≤ y∗S , using dβdr = − 1β dβdα again and rearranging yields:
dW (y, p∗S)
dr
= −
(
β − 1
r − αW (y, p
∗
S) +
1
β
dW (y, p∗S)
dα
)
< 0. (36)
It remains to rank the elasticities. A simple reorganization of terms together with 1β <
1
β−1 directly
leads to εW ∗/α < εV ∗/α and εW ∗/r > εV ∗/r. 
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A.4 Derivation of Ŵ (ŷ, pS) (Dynamic pricing problem)
Deterministic case:
For σ = 0, with the pricing rule PS(t) = P0e
γt, the downstream payoff has the simpler form
V̂ (y, yi, pS) =
piM
r−αyi
(
y
yi
) r
α − P0
(
y
yi
) r−γ
α
, and the optimal downstream investment policy is:
y∗i (pS) =

y if P0 <
piM
r−αy, γ ≥ α,
[y,∞) if P0 = piMr−αy, γ = α,(
(r−γ)P0
piM
) α
α−γ
y
− γ
α−γ if γ < α,
∞ if P0 > piMr−αy, γ = α or P0 ≥ piMr−αy, γ > α.
(37)
The upstream payoff is Ŵ (y, pS) = P0
(
y
y∗i (pS)
) r−γ
α − I
(
y
y∗i (pS)
) r
α
. At the maximum described
in the text, (P ∗0 , γ∗) =
(
piM
r−αY0, α
)
, the downstream is indifferent between all investment triggers in
[y,∞), and the upstream appropriates all the surplus. It can then be checked directly that no other
exponential price rule p′S simultaneously satisfies the two conditions y
∗
i (p
′
S) = y
∗ (efficient investment
trigger) and Ŵ (y, p′S) = V (y, y
∗, I) (upstream capture of the integrated value).
Optimal downstream policy, stochastic case:
If the input price follows a rule PS (t) = P0e
γt, the downstream firm faces a real option with
demand and cost uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck [8], Chapter 6). The investment trigger is then
an optimum ratio of market size to input cost Yt/PS(t) that has the form ŷ
∗
S =
β̂
β̂−1
r−α
piM
, where β̂ > 1 is
the unique positive root to the fundamental quadratic associated with the differential equation satisfied
by the option value V̂ , i.e. β̂ = 12 − α−γσ2 +
√(α−γ
σ2
− 12
)2
+ 2(r−γ)
σ2
. The trigger is well-defined so long
as α, γ < r. For ŷ < ŷ∗S , the optimal policy is a (stochastic) stopping time τ˜ = inf {τ > t, ŷ ≥ ŷ∗S}
(and immediate investment otherwise). The downstream option value is therefore:
V̂ (ŷ, ŷ∗S , pS) = Et
(
piM
r − αYτ˜ − PS (τ˜)
)
e−rτ˜ , (38a)
=
pS
β̂ − 1
(
ŷ
ŷ∗S
)β̂
, (38b)
all ŷ < ŷ∗S . Finally, note that
dŷ∗S
dγ = − 1(β̂−1)2
r−α
piM
dβ̂
dγ < 0 since
dβ̂
dγ =
β̂−1(
β̂−
(
1
2
−α−γ
σ2
))
σ2
> 0.
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Upstream payoff, stochastic case:
Given the downstream firm’s trigger, and supposing that ŷ < ŷ∗S so the downstream delays invest-
ment (otherwise Ŵ (P0, γ) = P0 − I directly), the upstream value at t = 0 is defined by:
Ŵ (P0, γ) = E0 (PS (τ˜)− I) e−rτ˜ , (39)
where τ˜ is the downstream’s stochastic stopping time. To obtain the expression (15) in the text, note
that the first summand in (39), E0PS (τ˜) e−rτ˜ , follows directly from the downstream stopping rule
(38a) and for the second term, the expected discount rate is E0e−rτ˜ =
(
ŷ
ŷ∗S
)β̂′
with β̂′ = 12 − α−γσ2 +√(α−γ
σ2
− 12
)2
+ 2r
σ2
since ŷ = (Y0/P0) exp
[(
α− γ − σ22
)
t+ σZt
]
.
Upstream optimization, stochastic case:
To summarize, the upstream’s problem is max(P0,γ)∈R×[0,r) Ŵ (ŷ, pS), with Ŵ continuous in σ and
in its arguments. The deterministic model (σ = 0) is a special case of the general problem and has a
unique solution that achieves the integrated firm value for the upstream firm. Therefore, as σ ↓ 0 the
upstream firm can approach the integrated value with an exponential pricing rule. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5 (Equilibrium with upstream and downstream duopoly)
The optimal follower investment threshold y∗F and second spot price p
∗
F having been discussed in the
text, only the first spot price p∗L and the preemption threshold y
∗
P remain to be established.
Preemption threshold (Stage 2):
As pL and p
∗
F are exogenous for price-taking downstream firms, only parameters of the value
functions are altered as compared with standard real option game models (specifically, the investment
cost, which is asymmetric for the first and second firm to invest), and existing arguments (Fudenberg
and Tirole [10], Huisman et al. [14]) apply to establish the existence of preemption equilibrium. In
particular, so long as the equation L (y, pL) = F (y, y
∗
F , p
∗
F ) has a root yP ∈ [y, y∗F ), downstream firms
seek to invest immediately when the market size reaches the threshold yP , with either firm equally
likely to effectively then invest as a leader.
As F (y, y∗F , p
∗
F ) is non-negative, increasing, and convex while L (y, pL) is increasing and concave
in y, and moreover since L (y, pL) decreases with pL, the threshold yP is well-defined for a range of
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input prices pL ∈
[
p, p
]
. The lower bound does not constrain the preemption outcome and upstream
optimization so long as the initial market size is sufficiently small, so we focus on the upper bound p.
Setting dL(y,pL)dy =
dF(y,y∗F ,p
∗
F )
dy , we find that tangency occurs at y =
(
piM
βpiM−(β−1)piD
) 1
β−1
y∗F . Note that
y < y∗F so long as piD < piM . Then, p is defined implicitly by the condition L (y, p) = F (y, y
∗
F , p
∗
F ).
Thus, for pL ∈
[
p, p
]
, a preemption equilibrium exists at the threshold yP (pL) that verifies
L (yP (pL) , pL) = F (yP (pL) , y
∗
F , p
∗
F ). Specifically, yP (pL) is defined implicitly by:
piM
r − αyP − pL −
β
β − 1
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)
I
(
yP
y∗F
)β
= 0. (40)
Upstream optimization (Stage 1):
The value of the upstream firm when the current market size is y is:
W˜ (y, pL, p
∗
F ) = (pL − I)
(
y
yP (pL)
)β
+ (p∗F − I)
(
y
y∗F
)β
. (41)
From (40) we obtain an expression of pL − I, which is plugged into (41). This leads to:
W˜ (y, pL, p
∗
F ) =
(
piM
r − αyP − I
)(
y
yP
)β
− β
β − 1
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)
I
(
y
y∗F
)β
+(p∗F − I)
(
y
y∗F
)β
. (42)
Note that the second and third summands in (42) are independent of yP , and the first summand is
identical to the integrated payoff (1) of Section 2.1. The upstream firm’s decision problem is thus that
of the integrated firm, and the first-order condition is satisfied at y∗P =
β
β−1
r−α
piM
I.
Substituting y∗ into (40) gives the optimal first spot price p∗L =
(
1−∆
(
β, piMpiD
))
β
β−1I, with
∆
(
β, piMpiD
)
≡
(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)1−β − ( ββ−1 piMpiD )−β. Since ββ−1 piMpiD > 1, ∆(β, piMpiD ) > 0. Also, ∆ (β, 1) =
(β−1)β−1
ββ
< 1β . We have
d∆
(
β,
piM
piD
)
d
piM
piD
= β
(
piD
piM
− 1
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)−β
< 0 because piM > piD, so ∆
(
β, piMpiD
)
<
1
β . In addition, it can be verified that y
∗
P < y if and only if ∆
(
β, piMpiD
)
< 1β , so the equilibrium
preemption trigger is in the admissible range.
Absence of simultaneous investment equilibrium in Stage 2:
We have described an equilibrium in which firms invest sequentially, but it is also necessary to
rule out simultaneous investment equilibria, as these can arise in real option games. Note first that in
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the sequential equilibrium, the upstream firm earns greater value from selling the input to the leader
than to the follower. After rearrangement, (p∗L − I)
(
y
yP (p
∗
L)
)β
> (p∗F − I)
(
y
y∗F
)β
if and only if:
Ξ
(
β,
piM
piD
)
≡
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
)β
− β
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
)
+ β − 1 > 0. (43)
Here, Ξ (β, 1) = (2β − 1)
(
1
f(β) − 1
)
> 0 (see Section A.2), and ∂Ξ
∂
piM
piD
= β
2
β−1
((
β
β−1
piM
piD
)β−1 − 1) > 0,
so Ξ
(
β, piMpiD
)
is positive for all admissible parameter values.
For a given price psim charged by the upstream firm in the event of simultaneous investment down-
stream (we allow psim 6= pL, pF ), the optimal simultaneous entry threshold is ysim (psim) = ββ−1 r−αpiD psim.
The upstream firm’s payoff in that case is Wsim (y, psim) = 2 (psim − I)
(
y
ysim(psim)
)β
, and the optimal
input price is p∗sim =
β
β−1I (= p
∗
F ). Then, the downstream firms both enter at the same date as a fol-
lower under preemption (ysim (p
∗
sim) = y
∗
F ). The upstream value at the candidate optimal simultaneous
investment equilibrium is therefore:
Wsim (y, p
∗
sim) = 2 (p
∗
F − I)
(
y
y∗F
)β
< (p∗L − I)
(
y
yP (p∗L)
)β
+ (p∗F − I)
(
y
y∗F
)β
= W˜ (y, p∗L, p
∗
F ) , (44)
where the inequality follows from the fact that the upstream makes greater profits off the leader’s
input than the follower’s. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6 (Comparative statics of the discount)
We have established that d∆
d
piM
piD
= β
(
piD
piM
− 1
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)−β
< 0 for all piM > piD in the proof of Propo-
sition 5. The other derivative is d∆dβ =
1
β−1
(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)−β (
piM
piD
− 1− ln
(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)(
β piMpiD − (β − 1)
))
.
The sign of d∆dβ is that of Υ
(
β, piMpiD
)
≡ piMpiD − 1 − ln
(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)(
β piMpiD − (β − 1)
)
. We have Υ (β, 1) =
− ln
(
β
β−1
)
, and dΥ
d
piM
piD
= (β − 1)
(
piD
piM
− 1
)
− β ln
(
β
β−1
piM
piD
)
< 0, so Υ
(
β, piMpiD
)
< 0. Thus, d∆dβ < 0. 
A.6.1 Additional comparative statics of input prices
To establish the ranking of the price elasticities described in the text (εp∗F /β = εp
∗
S/β
< εp∗L/β < 0),
note first that εp∗F /β = − 1β−1 < 0. Moreover, by Proposition 6,
d∆
(
β,
piM
piD
)
dβ < 0 so ε∆
(
β,
piM
piD
)
/β
< 0. It
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follows that εp∗L/β = ε
(
1−∆
(
β,
piM
piD
))
/β
+ εp∗F /β > εp
∗
F /β
. Finally, we establish that εp∗L/β < 0 by showing
that
dp∗L
dβ < 0. Let x ≡ ββ−1 piMpiD for compactness and first evaluate this expression:
dp∗L
dβ
= − I
(β − 1)2
(
1 + x−β (−β (β − 1) (x− 1) lnx+ (β − 2)x− (β − 1))
)
. (45)
Consider
dp∗L
dβ as a function of
piM
piD
. After simplification,
∂2p∗L
∂β∂ piMpiD
= −βx
−β (piM − piD) (β lnx− 2) I
(β − 1)piM , (46)
so
dp∗L
dβ is quasiconcave in
piM
piD
and attains a global maximum at β−1β e
2
β . Then, again after simplification,
∂p∗L
∂β
∣∣∣∣piM
piD
=β−1
β
e
2
β
= −
(
1 + (β − 1) e−2 − βe−2β−1β
)
I
(β − 1)2 . (47)
The sign of the numerator in (47) depends on the sign of the expression Φ (β) ≡ 1 + (β − 1) e−2 −
βe
−2β−1
β . We have Φ (1) = 0 and Φ′ (β) = e−2 − β−2β e−2
β−1
β > 0. Therefore,
∂p∗L
∂β
∣∣∣piM
piD
=β−1
β
e
2
β
< 0, from
which it follows that
dp∗L
dβ < 0. For completeness, note that trivially εp∗F /
piM
piD
= 0 < ε(
1−∆
(
β,
piM
piD
))
/
piM
piD
=
εp∗L/
piM
piD
. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7 (Industry structure comparisons)
Industry optimum:
First, we formally state the value maximization problem for the industry that is described infor-
mally in the text, that is max(y1,y2)∈[y,∞)×[max{y,y1},∞) L˜ (y, y1, y2, I) + F (y, y2, I) where:
L˜ (y, y1, y2, I) + F (y, y2, I) =
(
piM
r − αy1 − I
)(
y
y1
)β
+
(
2piD − piM
r − α y2 − I
)(
y
y2
)β
. (48)
This objective is separable and quasi-concave in its arguments over its domain of definition. If
piM/piD < 2, the optimum solution is interior, whereas if
piM
piD
≥ 2, ∂(L˜+F)∂y2 > 0 for all y2 > y, so
y∗2 =∞. When the solution is interior, y
∗
F
y2 =
β
β−1
(
2− piMpiD
)
from which the corresponding expression
in the text follows.
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Threshold rankings:
The rankings for the first firm triggers (y˜P < y
∗
P = y
∗
1 = y
∗ < y∗S) follow directly from Propositions
1 and 5, as well as the properties of standard preemption races. The follower trigger rankings similarly
result from the comparison of the values that are given in the text.
Industry structure rankings:
The industry value under preemption with an upstream input supplier is:
L˜ (y, y∗P , y
∗
F , p
∗
L) + F (y, y
∗
F , p
∗
F ) + W˜ (y, p
∗
L, p
∗
F ) = L˜ (y, y
∗
P , y
∗
F , I) + F (y, y
∗
F , I)
=
I
β − 1
(
y
y∗P
)β
+
((
β
β − 1
)2(
2− piM
piD
)
− 1
)
I
(
y
y∗F
)β
. (49)
It is this expression that we successively compare with industry value under bilateral monopoly and
standard preemption, as follows.
(i) After simplification, L˜ (y, y∗P , y
∗
F , I) + F (y, y
∗
F , I) > V (y, y
∗
S , p
∗
S) +W (y, p
∗
S) if and only if:
(2β − 1)
(
1
f(β)
− 1
)(
piM
piD
)β
− β2piM
piD
+ β2 + 2β − 1 > 0. (50)
Let Ψ
(
β, piMpiD
)
denote the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality (50), and recall that
lim∞ f (β) = 2e . Since the first term dominates, limβ→∞Ψ
(
β, piMpiD
)
= limpiM
piD
→∞Ψ
(
β, piMpiD
)
=∞. To
see that Ψ
(
β, piMpiD
)
can take negative values, observe that Ψ
(
β, piMpiD
)
is continuous and Ψ
(
1, piMpiD
)
=
2− piMpiD .
(ii) After simplification, L˜ (y, y∗P , y
∗
F , I) + F (y, y
∗
F , I) > 2V˜ (y, I, I)
(
= L˜ (y, y˜P , y˜F , I) + F (y, y˜F , I)
)
if and only if:
ββ
(β − 1)β−1
((
piM
piD
)β
− 2
)
− β2piM
piD
+ β2 + 2β − 1 > 0. (51)
Let Ω
(
β, piMpiD
)
denote the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality (51). The first term
dominates so limβ→∞Ω
(
β, piMpiD
)
= limpiM
piD
→∞Ω
(
β, piMpiD
)
= ∞. To see that the inequality can be
violated, take Ω(β, 1) = (2β − 1)
(
1− 1f(β)
)
, which is negative since f (β) ∈ (2e , 1). 
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